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U.S. adoption of a cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gases could place some domestic producers
at a disadvantage relative to international competitors who do not face similar regulation. To address
this issue, proposed federal climate change legislation includes a provision that would freely allocate
(or rebate) emission allowances to eligible sectors using a continuously updating output-based formula.
Eligibility for the rebates would be determined at the industry-level based on emissions or energy intensity
and a measure of import penetration. Dynamic updating of permit allocations has the potential to mitigate
adverse competitiveness impacts and emissions leakage in eligible industries. It can also undermine
the cost-effectiveness of permit market outcomes, as more of the mandated emissions reductions must
then be achieved by sources deemed ineligible for rebates. This chapter investigates both the benefits
and the costs of output-based updating. It identifies differences between proposed eligibility criteria
and those consistent with standard measures of economic efficiency. The analysis underlines the importance
of taking both benHfits and costs into account when determining the scale and scope of output-based
rebating provisions in cap-and-trade programs.
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A growing sense of urgency is fuelling e⁄orts to pass domestic climate change legislation now,
rather than waiting for a coordinated global agreement to emerge. Debates about how and when
to implement these policies have been dominated by concerns about potentially adverse impacts on
domestic industrial competitiveness, trade ￿ ows, and emissions leakage. Policy makers are looking
to strike an appropriate balance between curbing domestic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and
protecting the competitive position of domestic manufacturing in the near-term.
Border tax adjustments o⁄er one approach to "leveling the carbon playing ￿eld", as discussed
in the chapter by Krishna in this volume.1 This chapter considers an alternative approach. Pro-
posed federal climate change legislation includes provisions that would freely allocate emissions
allowances to eligible industries using a continuously updated, output-based formula. These free
permit allocations are designed to completely o⁄set both direct and indirect compliance costs
in eligible sectors, while preserving some incentive for individual ￿rms to reduce their emissions
intensity.
The potential bene￿ts of these proposed allocation provisions, including the mitigation of
emissions leakage and the moderation of adverse competitiveness impacts, have been well docu-
mented (US EPA, EIA, and Treasury, 2009). This chapter draws attention to the fact that these
bene￿ts come at a cost. When output-based rebates are o⁄ered to a subset of the sources in
an emissions trading program, a greater share of the mandated emissions reductions must then
be achieved by sources excluded from rebating provision. This can signi￿cantly undermine the
economic e¢ ciency of permit market outcomes.
The chapter makes two important contributions. First, it extends the previous literature
on output-based allocation updating in order to characterize cost-bene￿t trade-o⁄s inherent in
proposed output-based allocation updating provisions.2 A simple analytical model is used to
investigate the welfare consequences of allocating permits via output-based updating in one or
more industries in a GHG emissions trading program. In a ￿rst-best policy setting, output-based
permit allocation updating reduces welfare vis-a-vis auctioning or lump-sum permit allocations.3
If emissions regulation is incomplete (meaning that a subset of the emitting sources are exempt
from the regulation for some reason), the bene￿ts of output-based rebating can exceed the costs.
1An important concern with regard to these countervailing measures is that they may not pass WTO scrutiny.
Border tax adjustments included in the House bill were criticized by President Obama who noted that "we have to
be very careful about sending any protectionist signals￿(Rust Belt Democrats say Obama was ￿ wrong￿to criticize
trade provisions, E&ENews PM, 07/07/2009).
2 A growing literature investigates the e¢ ciency implications of output-based allocation updating. Previous
work has demonstrated how output-based allocation updating will generally undermine the e¢ ciency of permit
market outcomes in ￿rst best policy settings (Bohringer and Lange, 2005; Fischer, 2001; Sterner and Muller, 2008)
and that allocation updating has the potential to be advantageous when there are pre-existing distortions to contend
with (Bernard et al., 2006; Fischer, 2003; Fischer and Fox, 2007).
3A "￿rst-best" setting, in this context, is one that is free of market distortions or failures, other than the
environmental externality that the emissions regulation is designed to address.
1The net welfare implications of output-based rebating depend on a variety of factors, including
the elasticity of domestic demand and supply, the emissions intensity of domestic and foreign
production, and the price responsiveness of imports.
Second, the chapter illustrates how cost-bene￿t trade-o⁄s can inform decisions about the
appropriate scale and scope of these allocation-based incentives. Among the most fundamental
questions in the design of cost mitigation measures is: Who should be eligible for this assistance?
From an economic e¢ ciency perspective, output-based rebates should only be o⁄ered in cases
where the bene￿ts to the industry receiving the rebate exceed the costs imposed on other sectors
and stakeholders. The analytical model is used to derive eligibility criteria that are consistent
with a standard, albeit stylized, welfare maximization concept. This exercise helps to highlight
qualitative di⁄erences between the eligibility criteria de￿ned in proposed legislation and those
derived from a theoretical welfare maximization exercise.
Although this chapter is germane to ongoing policy debates, it is important to put this
analysis in context. The underlying model assumes a fairly stylized objective function for the
policy maker; political constraints are ignored entirely. In practice, the political viability of any
federal climate change policy is going to depend signi￿cantly on the distribution of costs and
bene￿ts across politically powerful constituencies. Permit allocation is the most important lever
that policy makers have to use to alter the distributional implications of an emissions cap-and-
trade program, so it seems inevitable that concessions will be made in order to design an emissions
trading program that is supported by key stakeholders. An important objective of this chapter
is to draw attention to the welfare costs incurred when these concessions come in the form of
output-based rebates.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section provides an overview of permit allocation
design in cap-and-trade programs, with an emphasis on the political economy of these design
decisions. Section 3 brie￿ y summarizes the output-based rebating provisions in the proposed
federal climate change legislation currently being considered by Congress. Section 4 presents a
simple analytical framework that can be used to characterize the advantages and disadvantages of
output-based updating provisions. Section 5 brings the analysis to bear upon the eligibility issue.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Permit allocation as industry compensation
Historically, policy makers have chosen between two types of permit allocation approaches: auc-
tioning and grandfathering. Under an auction regime, emissions permits are sold to the highest
bidder. In contrast, "grandfathered" permits are freely distributed in lump-sum to regulated
sources based on pre-determined, ￿rm-speci￿c characteristics.
In theory, provided standard assumptions are met, the e¢ ciency properties of the permit
2market equilibrium are achieved regardless of whether permits are auctioned or grandfathered.4
This so-called "independence property" has important policy implications (Hahn and Stavins,
2010). If the initial distribution of permits plays no role in the determination of emissions and
abatement outcomes in equilibrium, emissions permits can be freely allocated to pursue political
objectives (such as establishing a constituency for the market-based regulation).
Economists have generally argued in favor of auctioning permits when auction revenues can be
used to o⁄set factor taxes or other pre-existing distortions.5 However, policy makers have routinely
chosen to forego auction revenues in favor of handing permits out for free to regulated entities.6
The ability to make concessions to adversely impacted and politically powerful stakeholders via
grandfathering has played an essential role in securing widespread support for the adoption of
emissions trading programs.
A pure grandfathering approach is unlikely to be a politically feasible option in the context
of a Federal GHG trading program, primarily due to the unprecedented value of the permits to
be allocated.7 A lump-sum allocation of all GHG permits to regulated sources would likely result
in signi￿cant overcompensation (Bovenberg and Goulder, 2001). Pure auctioning is also unlikely
because politically powerful industry stakeholders are united in their opposition to this approach
(at least in the near term).8
In this politically charged climate, "output-based updating" of permit allocations has emerged
as something of a Goldilocks solution. Proposed output-based updating provisions are designed
to o⁄set the average e⁄ect that emissions regulation would otherwise have on producers￿variable
operating costs. Industry is compensated - but not overcompensated- for the compliance costs
incurred. Because the number of permits a ￿rm is freely allocated is increasing with its output,
equilibrium levels of domestic manufacturing activity will exceed those associated with auctioning
or grandfathering. This in turn implies larger domestic market shares in trade-exposed markets,
fewer manufacturing jobs lost, and less emissions leakage.
The economic bene￿ts and political advantages of output-based updating come with strings
attached. An important drawback is that the independence property no longer holds. Making
4Assumptions include: perfectly competitive input and output markets, no pre-existing regulatory distortions
(such as factor taxes), zero transaction costs, complete information, lump-sum free allocations and compliance
cost minimizing ￿rms. This result is closely related to a seminal paper by Coase (1960) and has been formally
demonstrated in a an emissions permit market context by Montgomery (1972).
5A summary of the literature that considers the permit allocation design choice in the presence distorted factor
markets is provided by Goulder and Parry(2008).
6A majority of permits are distributed freely to regulated entities in Southern California￿ s RECLAIM program,
the European Union￿ s Emissions Trading Program (EU ETS), the National Acid Rain Program (ARP), and the
regional NOx Budget Trading Program.
7The Congressional Budget O¢ ce estimates that emissions permits allocated annually under the federal cap-
and-trade system proposed by the Senate in 2009 could be worth up to $300 billion a year by 2020 (CBO, 2009).
8The US Climate Action Partnership, a non-partisan coalition comprised of 25 major corporations and 5 leading
environmental groups, has urged Congress to use some portion of allowances to bu⁄er the impacts of increased
costs to energy consumers, and to provide transitional assistance to trade-exposed and emissions intensive industry
(USCAP, "A Blueprint for Legislative Action", January 2009).
3future permit allocations conditional on current production choices undermines the e¢ ciency of
the permit market outcome by dampening (or eliminating) incentives for consumers to reduce
their consumption of goods produced by industries receiving output-based rebates. Increased
production (and emissions) in these industries shifts more of the compliance burden to sources
outside the provision. Contingent allocation updating therefore introduces important trade-o⁄s
between reducing the compliance cost burden for a speci￿c sector and minimizing the overall
economic cost of achieving mandated emissions reductions.
3 Proposed measures to address near-term competitive-
ness impacts
Climate change legislation recently passed in the House and reported by committee in the Senate
would establish a multi-sector cap-and-trade system in which a subset of industries are eligible
rebates (in the form of a free permit allocation) for direct and indirect compliance costs.9 Figure
1 illustrates the proposed eligibility criteria. Eligibility is determined at the six-digit NAICS
industry classi￿cation level. The size of each industry-speci￿c circle re￿ ects annual greenhouse gas
emissions in 2006. The horizontal axis measures energy expenditures as a share of the value of
domestic production. The vertical axis measures the combined value of exports and imports as a
share of the value of domestic production plus imports. This measure is intended to capture the
extent to which an industry is exposed to foreign competition.
An industry is de￿ned to be "presumptively eligible" for output-based rebates if energy in-
tensity or greenhouse gas emissions intensity is at least ￿ve percent and import penetration is at
least 15 percent. Industries with energy or emissions intensities exceeding 20 percent are also eli-
gible regardless of trade intensity. The broken line in Figure 1 traces out this eligibility threshold.
Industries lying to the right of this line are presumptively eligible to receive rebates under this
provision.
Recent analysis suggest that 44 manufacturing industries are presumptively eligible based
on these criteria. Taken together, these industries account for 6 percent of all manufacturing
employment and 12 percent of the total value of annual manufacturing shipments (US EPA, EIA,
and Treasury, 2009). Approximately 15 percent of the total allocation is set aside for output-based
rebating. This annual set-aside exceeds the total emissions of presumptively eligible industries in
2006.
The potential bene￿ts of this output-based rebating provision have been analyzed in detail.
Multiple recent studies of H.R. 2454 predict that output-based rebating will signi￿cantly mitigate,
9Direct compliance costs are calculated as the product of the eligible entity￿ s output two years prior and the
greenhouse gas emissions intensity for all entities in the sector. Rebates for indirect emissions costs are based on
the eligible entity￿ s electricity use, the average electricity intensity in the sector, and an estimate of the emissions
intensity of the electricity consumed by the eligible entity.
4if not eliminate, negative impacts on energy-intensive manufacturing outputs and emissions leakage
( EIA, 2009; US EPA, 2009; US EPA, EIA, and Treasury, 2009). Although much work has been
done to document the bene￿ts of this compensating provision, there have been few, if any, attempts
to estimate the costs.
4 The costs and bene￿ts of output-based rebating
This section provides a framework for analyzing the cost-bene￿t trade-o⁄s inherent in output-
based allocation updating. To keep the analysis tractable and intuitive, I make several simplifying
assumptions:
1. General equilibrium e⁄ects, including interactions with pre-existing factor taxes, are not
considered.
2. Throughout the analysis, the permit price ￿ is an exogenous parameter, equivalent to as-
suming that the aggregate marginal abatement cost curve is ￿ at in the neighborhood of the
constraint imposed by the emissions cap. This assumption is likely to be approximately true
in a federal GHG trading program that permits o⁄sets.10
3. I focus exclusively on the short-run implications of output-based rebates. Because output-
based rebating is intended as a temporary "stop-gap" measure, an analysis that conditions
on initial technological characteristics is important.11
4. Operating costs and emissions rates are assumed to be immutable technology characteristics
in the short-run. In fact, many industries have some ability to reduce their emissions in-
tensity in the short-run through fuel switching or input substitution. Short-run abatement
opportunities will lower the costs of output-based updating, all else equal.
5. The model does not capture heterogeneity in cost structure and emissions intensity across
producers within an industry. This rules out any reallocation of production to relatively clean
￿rms (which would reduce the costs of output-based rebating).
6. Social welfare is de￿ned to be the value of consumption less the costs of industrial production
less costs associated with greenhouse gases emitted as a consequence of this production and
consumption.
10Keohane (2009) estimates the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve in the United States to be 8.0 x
107 $/GT CO2 for the period 2010￿ 2050 (expressed in present-value terms and in 2005 dollars). If this value is
used to crudely approximate the slope of the permit supply function, a ten percent reduction in the emissions of
"presumptively eligible" industries over this forty year period is associated with only a $0.25/ ton decrese in permit
price.
11Output-based allowance allocations for emissions-intensive U.S. industry are portrayed as a "stop-
gap measure". "The Carbon Leakage Prevention Act (H.R. 7146) Output-Based Allowance Alloca-
tion for Emissions-Intensive U.S. Industry Rep. Jay Inslee (D-WA) and Rep Mike Doyle (D-PA)."
http://otrans.3cdn.net/5c61e8367815ece533_7om6bhijz.pdf accessed April 15, 2010.
54.1 Rebating compliance costs in an autarkic industry
I ￿rst consider a perfectly competitive industry in which there is no trade with unregulated ju-
risdictions (i.e. the "autarkic" case). This exercise helps to lay the foundation for the more
complicated, trade-exposed industry case. It is relevant to the proposed permit allocation regime
that would make industries with no trade exposure, but exceptionally high emissions intensities,
eligible for output-based allocations.
The industry is comprised of N identical sellers producing a homogeneous good q and gener-
ating greenhouse gases. These producers have convex cost functions C(qi), linear marginal costs




inverse demand function is p(Q) = a ￿ bQ:
Firms in this industry are required to participate in a greenhouse gas emissions trading pro-
gram. To remain in compliance, producers must hold su¢ cient permits to o⁄set their emissions
eq. I assume that all ￿rms comply with the program and that the aggregate cap binds such that
￿ > 0: A ￿rm￿ s short-run pro￿t function is:
￿i = p(Q)qi ￿ C(qi) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ s)eqi + ￿Li;
where C(qi) captures ￿rm-level operating costs and s is the rate at which compliance costs are
rebated to ￿rms, s 2 (0;1).
This simple model nests the three classes of permit allocation regimes under consideration.
The ￿rm￿ s lump sum permit allocation is Li: Let E represent the total number of permits to be




Li = E and s = 0: Under complete output-based rebating, Li = 0
8 i and s = E
Q:
The assumption of identical ￿rms implies that Q = nqi: Pro￿t maximization implies that the




a ￿ ￿e + s￿e
b + c
; (1)
where the subscript A denotes the autarkic case.
Conditioning on the model parameters ￿, a; b, and c, we can express the welfare implications







C(x)dx ￿ ￿eQ(s): (2)
This welfare measure captures the bene￿ts from consumption less the costs of production less
6damages from industry emissions.
The net welfare impact of o⁄ering an output-based rebate (relative to the welfare obtained un-
der a more standard auctioning or grandfathering permit allocation regime) can thus be expressed
as:




Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration of the partial-equilibrium welfare consequences of
output-based allocation updating at a rate of s = 1 relative to the baseline case (i.e. a grandfa-
thering or auctioning regime where s = 0).
In the baseline case, quantity C is sold at price A. When compliance costs are rebated in full,
a quantity D is sold at a price of B. The net increase in producer and consumer surplus is area
EGH. The rebate also induces an increase in industry emissions of (D ￿ C)e:
System-wide emissions are subject to the same binding cap across all allocation regimes, so any
rebate-induced increase in emissions from this industry must be o⁄set elsewhere. Put di⁄erently,
when output-based rebates are o⁄ered to this industry, abatement in other industries under the
cap or purchases of permits from other countries must rise relative to grandfathering or auctioning
levels. By assumption 2, there is a su¢ cient supply of abatement from sources outside the industry
to o⁄set this increase in emissions at a per unit cost of ￿. The costs of permit allocation updating
manifest as an increase in the abatement costs incurred at sources outside this industry. In ￿gure
2, this cost is represented by area EFGH: Subtracting this rebate-induced cost from the bene￿ts
yields a welfare cost equal to the shaded area EFG .12
Two insights from this autarkic case are worth highlighting. First, auctioning or grandfa-
thering welfare dominates output-based allocation updating.13 This is because the rebate-induced
decrease in abatement costs incurred by the industry receiving the rebate is smaller (in absolute
value) than the rebate-induced increase in abatement costs incurred in other sectors under the
cap.
Second, the net welfare cost of output-based rebating (vis-a-vis grandfathering or auctioning)
is increasing with emissions intensity.14 The costs of output-based updating manifest as increases
in the overall costs of achieving the mandated emissions cap. Intuitively, the more emissions
intensive the industry, the larger the e⁄ect of a given output-based rebate s on total industry
12Figure 2 also helps to illustrate some of the distributional consequences of output-based rebating. Producers
in this industry will prefer the output-based rebating to an auctioning regime; pro￿ts increase from AEJ under
auctioning to BGO with a full output-based rebate. However, producers will most prefer grandfathering if producer
surplus AEJ + ￿L > BGO.
13The analysis in the text omits the following two examples of second-best considerations. First, in an imperfectly
competitive industry, the implicit production subsidy can mitigate the pre-existing distortion associated with the
exercise of market power and output-based allocation updating can welfare-dominate auctioning or grandfathering,
even in the autarkic case. Second, output-based allocations can be used to reduce the distortionary e⁄ects of factor
tax distortions (Fischer and Fox, 2007).
14To see this, note that the derivative of [3] with respect to e is negative. In Figure 2, the height of the area
that de￿nes the net welfare cost of updating is ￿e: The area of this parallelogram is increasing with e.
7emissions in equilibrium, the greater the required increase in emissions abatement among other
sectors and sources.
4.2 Rebating compliance costs in a trade-exposed industry
In order to extend the analysis to a trade-exposed industry, a linear import supply schedule is
added to the model:
p(Q
M) = d + gQ
M; (4)
where QM represent the quantity of imports supplied at price p. At any price below d, import
supply is zero. As the slope of the import supply schedule g approaches in￿nity, this model reduces
to the autarkic case.















bd ￿ b￿e + bs￿e + g(s￿e + a ￿ ￿e)
bc + g(b + c)
: (6)
Note that as the slope of the import supply curve approaches in￿nity (and import pressure ap-
proaches zero) this quantity approaches Q￿
A: Solving for the equilibrium price and substituting




ac ￿ bd ￿ cd + b￿e ￿ bs￿e
bc + bg + cg
(7)


















The third argument in (8) captures expenditures on imports: The last argument measures damages
from import-related emissions. The emissions intensity of imports is eM. Emissions in foreign
jurisdictions are penalized at the same rate as domestic emissions (￿ per unit of emissions): This
assumes that the domestic permit price serves as an adequate measure of marginal emissions
damages and that the damages caused by an incremental change in emissions are independent
8of the source. This will be true for greenhouse gases provided there are no co-emissions of local
pollutants. The welfare measure in (8) ignores any surplus accruing to foreign ￿rms; only costs
and bene￿ts a⁄ecting domestic stakeholders are accounted for.
Substituting equations (5), (6) and (7) into (8) yields a measure of welfare in terms of the
model parameters a;b;c;d;e;g;￿;s. Subtracting WTE(0) from WTE(s) captures the welfare e⁄ect
of allocation updating vis-a-vis grandfathering or updating. A comprehensive, analysis of how
this e⁄ect varies systematically with di⁄erent model parameters is beyond the scope of this paper.
Instead, a more general and conceptual discussion provides the essential intuition
In a trade-exposed and emissions intensive industry, the relative welfare e⁄ect WTE(s)￿
WTE(0) can be decomposed into three parts:
1. The e⁄ect on domestic economic surplus (measured by the ￿rst three arguments in (8)). This
e⁄ect will be positive for two reasons. Similar to the autarkic case, an increase in the level of
production and consumption generates more producer and consumer surplus. Add to this the
transfer of surplus from foreign to domestic producers as the share of the domestic market
served by foreign imports decreases under updating.
2. The e⁄ect on domestic emissions (and associated costs). As in the autarkic case, the rebate-
induced increase in production leads to an increase in domestic emissions. All else equal, this
increases abatement costs incurred in other industries subject to the cap.
3. The e⁄ect on foreign emissions. Foreign imports are reduced under output-based updating,
as are the emissions associated with those imports. This mitigation of emissions "leakage" is
an important bene￿t of output-based updating in a trade-exposed industry.
In sum, allocation updating in a trade-exposed industry increases the direct costs of achieving
the mandated emissions reductions. However, unlike the autarkic case, it confers additional welfare
bene￿ts in the form of leakage mitigation and a transfer of surplus from foreign to domestic
producers. These additional bene￿ts will, in some trade-exposed industry contexts, justify the
costs of allocation updating. For any given set of model parameters a;b;c;d;￿; s, and g, there
is a corresponding threshold emissions intensity below which the bene￿ts of updating exceed the
costs.
5 Welfare implications of output-based rebates
The foregoing analysis has implications for determining which industries should receive output-
based rebates. In this section, I derive the eligibility criteria used by a policy maker seeking to
maximize social welfare as de￿ned by (8). In keeping with the provisions in proposed federal
legislation, I assume that the output-based rebates will refund compliance costs in full (i.e. s = 1)
and that eligibility determinations will be based on two observable industry characteristics: a
measure of import penetration ( c
c+g), and emissions intensity e.
9The derivation proceeds as follows. First, in order to de￿ne eligibility criteria in terms of
emissions intensity and import penetration parameters exclusively, I must assume values for the
other model parameters ￿, a; b, c, d, and eM. Let ￿ represent a given set of these parameter values.
Conditional on ￿, I identify all of the e and c
c+g combinations that are associated with a welfare
level under updating WTE(1) that is greater than or equal to the corresponding welfare level under
auctioning or grandfathering WTE(0):
Figure 3 plots illustrates results for two di⁄erent ￿ values (￿1 and ￿2).15 The solid line
represents the welfare maximizing eligibility threshold associated with ￿1. This line connects all
of the combinations of e and c
c+g which, given ￿1, yield equivalent welfare outcomes WTE(1) =
WTE(0). All points to the left (right) of this line are associated with industry contexts in which
output-based updating welfare dominates (is welfare dominated by) auctioning or grandfathering
regimes. The broken line is the eligibility threshold associated with a di⁄erent set of assumed
parameter values ￿2:
The most striking di⁄erence between the derived thresholds in Figure 3 and the proposed
threshold in Figure 1 is that the relationship between emissions intensity and eligibility status
is reversed. Under proposed allocation designs, the most emissions intensive industries are pre-
sumptively eligible for output-based compensation, presumably because these industries stand to
bene￿t the most from the provision. In Figure 3, industries with high emissions intensities are
not eligible for output-based rebates because the bene￿ts accruing to the industry receiving the
rebate are smaller than the costs to the economy as a whole.
Figure 3 also helps to illustrate how the sign of the net-welfare e⁄ect of allocation updat-
ing cannot be completely determined based on emissions intensity and import share alone. Put
di⁄erently, when eligibility rules are determined based on emissions intensity and trade exposure
measures exclusively, there is no one eligibility threshold that ￿ts all industries. Parameter values
in ￿1 and ￿2 are identical except that the import emissions intensity parameter eM is higher in
￿2: An industry located at point A is eligible if it can be described using the parameter values
in ￿1, but ineligible if it is described by the values in ￿2. Intuitively, the bene￿ts from allocation
updating will be greater when imports are more emissions intensive and the emissions leakage
potential is greater.
6 Conclusion
This chapter presents a framework for thinking about the cost-bene￿t trade-o⁄s inherent in output-
based allocation updating. A simple analytical model is used to examine the welfare impacts
of providing output-based rebates to an industry regulated under market-based environmental
regulation. In a perfectly competitive industry with no exposure to competition from unregulated
15The model is not parameterized to represent any industry in particular. Simple parameter values are chosen
to maximize expositional clarity (values are reported in Figure notes).
10imports, these welfare impacts are unambiguously negative. However, when domestic producers
compete with ￿rms in less stringently regulated jurisdictions, the bene￿ts of output-based updating
may exceed the costs. In this context, the net welfare impacts of introducing output-based rebates
will depend on a number of factors, including the emissions intensity of domestic production and
the price elasticity of supply and demand.
The chapter concludes with an analysis of one of the most fundamental issues in allocation-
based cost mitigation: eligibility. The model is used to demonstrate the stark contrast between
the eligibility criteria contained in proposed legislation and those implied by economic welfare
maximization.
Although the eligibility requirements in Figure 1 di⁄er qualitatively from those derived in
this chapter, they are consistent with interest group theories of regulation. When policy impacts
are concentrated among few and costs are di⁄usely distributed among many, these few have an
incentive to advocate for surplus redistribution (or compensation) at the expense of the larger, but
relatively disinterested, many (Olson ,1965; Stigler, 1971). Output-based rebates o⁄er a politically
palatable means of redistributing surplus from foreign ￿rms and the majority of industries where
compliance costs are expected to be relatively insigni￿cant (industries to the left of the eligibility
threshold in Figure 1) to a minority of industries that expect to experience signi￿cant adverse
impacts under federal GHG emissions regulation (industries to the right of the threshold in Fig-
ure 1). A politically viable climate policy regime will need to shelter these politically powerful
industries from signi￿cant adverse impacts. This chapter draws attention to the costs incurred
when output-based rebates are chosen as the vehicle for transferring surplus to these important
industries.
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Figure 2.  Energy Intensity, Trade Intensity, and Emissions of U.S. Manufacturing Sectors at the Six-Digit NAICS Code Level
1
105%  1. Malt Manufacturing(311213) 16
2. Wet Corn Milling(311221) "Presumptively Eligible"  for "Trade-Vulnerable" Allocations  42 3. Rendering and Meat Byproduct Processing (311613) 
4. Yarn Spinning Mills (313111)  Not "Presumptively Eligible"  for "Trade-Vulnerable" Allocations  24 5. Tire Cord and Tire Fabric Mills (314992) 
7 6. Reconstituted Wood Product Manufacturing (321219)  90%  Size of bubble reflects  20 7. Pulp Mills (322110) 
relative magnitude of  8. Paper (except Newsprint) Mills (322121) 
22 sector's emissions  9. Newsprint Mills (322122) 
10. Paperboard Mills (322130) 
37 11. Petrochemical Manufacturing (325110)  75% 


















44 39& 40 13. Alkalies and Chlorine Manufacturing (325181) 
9 14. Carbon Black Manufacturing (325182) 
15. All Other Basic Inorganic Chemical Mfg. (325188)  23
16. Cyclic Crude and Intermediate Manufacturing (325192)  41 15 30 17. All Other Basic Organic Chemical Mfg. (325199)  19
28 H.R. 2454  18. Plastics Material and Resin Manufacturing (325211) 
17 29 19. Synthetic Rubber Manufacturing (325212)  Eligibility 
20. Cellulosic Organic Fiber Manufacturing(325221)  Threshold 
25 5 45%  21. Noncellulosic Organic Fiber Manufacturing (325222) 
22. Nitrogenous Fertilizer Manufacturing (325311)  12 1 14 21 23. Vitr. China Plumbing Fixture and Other Mfg.  (327111)  27 6 36 35 24. Vitreous China and OtherPottery Mfg. (327112)  31 18 4 25. Porcelain Electrical Supply Manufacturing (327113) 
30%  10 45 3 13 26. Ceramic Wall and Floor Tile Manufacturing (327122) 






0% 5%  10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 
Notes:   Energy Intensity2
1.  Petroleum refining is not depicted because it is explicitly excluded from  H.R. 2454's allocations to "trade-vulnerable"  industries. Also,  91 
other sectors,with 126MMTCO2e of emissions, are not depicted due to lack of trade intensity data.  One of these, iron and steel pipe and tube 
manufacturing from purchased steel (331210; 2.5 MMTCO2e) is expected to be eligible based on language in the bill.  Four others meet the 
energy-intensity threshold, each with 2 to 3 MMTCO2e of emissions: beet sugar manufacturing , broadwoven fabric finishing mills, steel 
foundries (except investment), and metal heat treating. Twelve sectors with a calculated trade intensity greater than 100%  are depicted here with 
an intensity of 100% (the maximum possible intensity).  The two copper sectors (212234 and 331411) do not meet the energy or trade intensity 
thresholds specified in H.R. 2454 but are expected to be eligible based on other language in the bill. 
2.  Energy intensity and trade intensity measures are as defined in H.R. 2454 and elsewhere in this report. 
Source: EPA analysis. 
 
27. Other Structural Clay Product Manufacturing (327123) 
28. Nonclay Refractory Manufacturing (327125) 
29. Flat Glass Manufacturing (327211) 
30. OtherPressed/Blown Glass and Glsswr.Mfg. (327212) 
31. Glass Container Manufacturing (327213) 
32. Cement Manufacturing (327310) 
33. Lime Manufacturing (327410) 
34. Ground or Treated Mineraland Earth Mfg. (327992) 
35. Mineral Wool Manufacturing (327993) 
36. Iron and Steel Mills (331111) 
37. Electrometallurgical Ferroalloy Product Mfg. (331112) 
38. Iron/Steel Pipe/Tube Mfg. from Purchsd. Steel (331210) 
39. Alumina Refining (331311) 
40. Primary Aluminum Production (331312) 
41. Primary Smelting and Refining of Copper (331411) 
42. Smltg./Rfg. of Nonfrs. Mtl. (ex. Cpr. and Almn.) (331419) 
43. Iron Foundries (331511) 
44. Carbon and Graphite ProductManufacturing (335991) 
45. Iron Ore Mining(212210) 
46. Copper Ore and Nickel Ore Mining (212234)   
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Figure 3 : Welfare maximizing  eligibility thresholds 
Notes: These eligibility thresholds are derived from the unconstrained welfare maximization exercise described in the text. Lines 
connect all points that correspond with a net welfare impact of zero given parameters in θ. Points to the left of the curve are 
associated with positive welfare changes (i.e. output‐based rebating is welfare improving). Points to the right are associated with 
negative welfare changes. Assumed parameter values associated with the solid line: θ1 = {a=50; b=1; c=1; d=0; e
m=1; t=5; s=1}. The 
broken line is associated with a set of parameters θ2 that is identical to θ1 except that e
m=3. An industry at point A is ineligible given 
θ1 because costs exceed the benefits accruing from output‐based rebates. This industry is eligible given θ2 because the benefits – 
including increased benefits associated with leakage mitigation‐ outweigh the costs. 
J 